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Introduction
Computer crime in Georgia has provided fertile ground
for hackers at the beginning their criminal activities,
which in turn is facilitated by an absence of a unified
security system, the lack of knowledge and ability of the
law enforcement authorities in the high-tech field, and
arguably the high level of latency of cybercrime in
Georgia. When substantiating the insignificance of the
problem in Georgia, many people often refer to official
statistics. In order to make the research for my
doctorate more thorough,1 the author applied to the
Administration of Ministry of Internal Affairs for the
official statistics relating to the investigation of
cybercrimes. The Ministry replied to my request with a
letter dated 12 December 2007, reference 7/2/7-4772. It
transpires that five cases have been registered in the
years between 2001 and 2007, and two cases have been
dealt with, in that the perpetrators were identified and
convicted; one of these cases is discussed below. One
further cybercrime was detected in 2008. As the final
result, a total of six computer crimes have been
registered in Georgia since 2001. Certainly, according to
these data, there is practically no cybercrime problem in
Georgia, but as readers of this Journal will be aware, is
not difficult to invalidate the above opinion. With few
exceptions, there are no Georgian monographs or
research papers on the problem of computer crime, and
no instructions and recommendations to improve the
work of the law enforcement bodies to investigate
cybercrime.
Against the background of numerous legal and
practical problems in dealing with computer crimes in
Georgia, the President of Georgia issued Decree No 215
of March 28, 2008 ‘On Signing the Convention on
Cybercrime’,2 days before signing the Convention on
Cybercrime  on 1 April 2008.3 On 9 January 2009, the
‘United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership’
was signed between Georgia and the United States of
America in Washington, DC.4 Section IV paragraph 2 of
the Charter includes cooperation between the two
countries on the issue of cybercrime:
‘The United States and Georgia pledge cooperation to
strengthen further the rule of law, including by
increasing judicial independence. In this regard, the
United States intends to provide assistance in this
process, including training of judges, prosecutors,
defence lawyers, and police officers. Through
enhanced law-enforcement and judicial-branch
relationships, we plan to address common
transnational criminal threats such as terrorism,
organized crime, trafficking in persons and narcotics,
money laundering, and cybercrime.’
In August 2009, Christina Schulman stated in the E-
Newsletter on the fight against cybercrime that among
current programmes, the cybercrime project in Georgia
was one of the most important projects aimed at
assisting Georgia in developing a relevant policy in
connection with the implementation of the Council of
Europe Convention on Cybercrime.5 This article will
By Ucha Zaqashvili 
1 The author is a candidate for a doctoral degree at
Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Tbilisi,
Georgia, with the following research title:
“Problems of legal regulation and investigation of
computer crimes in Georgia”.
2 Budapest, 23.XI.2001 ETS No 185.
3 Work has already begun in Georgia to implement
the terms of the Convention. On 29 September
2009, a workshop was held at the Ministry of
Justice in Tbilisi with the Council of Europe on the
practical issues to be addressed under the
‘Project on Cybercrime in Georgia’ – the
programme is available at
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/ cooperation/
economiccrime/cybercrime/cy_project_in_georgia/
2215_draft_agenda_ws_23Sep09.pdf.
4 A copy is available at http://www.america.gov/
st/texttrans-english/2009/January/
20090109145313eaifas0.2139093.html.
5 Cristina Schulman, ‘Council of Europe measures
for fighting against cybercrime’, E-Newsletter on
the Fight Against Cybercrime, Issue 2, August
2009, p. 35.
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review the problems of the legal regulation of computer
crime, and the investigation of computer crime in Georgia.
The criminal regulation of cybercrime 
in Georgia
Chapter XXXV of the Criminal Code of Georgia is
included in Book IX “Crimes against public security and
order”, and consists of articles 284, 285 and 286 under
the heading “Computer crimes”. One additional article
stipulating criminal liability covers cyber terrorism
(article 3241), which is included in Chapter XXXVIII
(Terrorism) of the Criminal Code, which in turn is
included in Book XI (Crimes against the State). Under
the Criminal Code of Georgia, computer crimes are
classified as minor offences (except cyber terrorism).
Their objective elements are mainly material, but we
may also deal with formally defined crimes as well.6
The offences under article 284
The unofficial translation of article 284 provides:
Article 284. Unauthorized access to computer
information
1. Unauthorized access to computer information
protected by law stored in electronic computers,
their systems or networks or on the machine
carriers that causes the erasure, blocking,
modifying or obtaining data, or disturbing the work
of electronic computers, their systems or networks,
as well as changing the International Mobile
Equipment Identifier. 
shall be punishable with a fine, or by corrective labour
for up to two years or imprisonment within the same
term.
2. The same action performed by:
a) a group of persons in prior agreement;
b) the abuse of an official position;
c) a person having access to electronic computers,
their systems or networks,-
shall be punishable with a fine, or by corrective labour
for up to two years in length or imprisonment within
the term from two to five years.
3.The action provided by Parts 1 or 2 of the current
article that entail grave consequences is punished
with a fine, or imprisonment within the term from
two to five years.
The definition of the object of the crime is important.
This provides for the correct classification of an action
as a crime, so that it is possible to distinguish one crime
from another and to correctly decide the issue of
liability. The generic object of crime is the main basis of
the system of the private part of the Criminal Law7 As
the chapter dedicated to computer crimes is included in
the Book IX of the Criminal Code of Georgia – “Crimes
against public security and order”, it should be
mentioned that the legislator has defined public
security and order as the generic object of these crimes.
Dr Katzman points out that the results of unauthorized
use of information may vary: it may violate security of
intellectual property as well as disclose information
about the private lives of citizens, cause property
damage, reputation damage, and the violation of
normal process of production, amongst other things.
The generic object of trying to prevent computer crime
is the provision of public security and order, and the
general object is the unity of all social relations for the
lawful and secure use of information.
Dr Katzman associates the definition of direct objects
with the headings of specific articles containing
elements of computer crime.8 Associate professor G.
Mamulashvili specifies the privacy of the data stored in
6 In the Criminal Code of Georgia (which falls under
the Romano-Germanic legal system), crimes are
divided into formally defined crimes and
materially defined crimes. Formally defined crimes
are criminal actions that do not require a certain
result to define them as completed crimes. For
example, robbery is the crime of taking money or
material values by threatening with a weapon. To
charge a person with robbery, it is not necessary
for a corresponding result to occur. The act will be
considered completed immediately upon
commitment of the action as stipulated by the
offence. Materially defined crimes imply the
existence of a certain result following the action,
for instance, a murder. If there is no corpse, a
person cannot be sentenced for murder if he only
shot or threatened another with killing. In this
instance, it is argued that materially defined
crimes are also relevant.
7 A. Gabiani, N. Gvenetadze, I. Dvalidze, N. Todua,
M. Ivanidze and others, General Part of Criminal
Law, (Tbilisi University Press, Tbilisi, 2004), p. 91.
8 A. Katzman, PhD thesis “Computer crime”, (Ivane
Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Tbilisi, 2004),
p. 35. In the Criminal Code of Georgia there are
four elements to an offense: 
1 The object of the crime that implies an object
for the purpose of infringement upon which the
crime is committed;
2 The subject of a crime implies a person who
may commit a crime;
3 The objective aspect of crime implies the
content of the criminal action;
4 The mental element of crime implies the
perpetrator’s attitude towards the action that
has been committed, which includes direct
intent, negligence, recklessness etc.
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9 M. Lekveishvili, G. Mamulashvili, N. Todua and N.
Gvenetadze, Private Part of Criminal Law, Book 1,
(Meridian, Tbilisi, 2005), p. 613.
10 A. Katzman, PhD thesis, “Computer crime”, (Ivane
Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Tbilisi, 2004),
p. 39.
11 The term ‘special object’ can be described in
terms of where, for instance, the punishment for
murder is imprisonment for 15 years. It is clear that
the object of this crime is the death of a human
being, but if the legislator includes an article in
which it is determined that the murder of a woman
that is pregnant shall be punished with
imprisonment for 20 years, it means that the
legislator considers the life of a pregnant woman
as an object of special protection. In this case, the
author implies such object under the term ‘special
object’. For instance, obtaining unauthorized
access to a computer system is punished with
imprisonment of up to 2 years. However, it could
be argued that where a person obtains
unauthorized access to a computer system that is
the state property must be punished more
severely. In this case, the state owned computer
system becomes the object of special protection of
law.
12 M. Tsatsanashvili, “Informational society and legal
regulation of information”, (Tech-Inform, 1999,
page 26.
the computer, that is, the property right to digital data,9
as the direct object of the crime provided for in article
284, but the direct object of the offense may be the use
of copyright material, for instance. The subject of the
offense set out in article 284 is ‘computer information’
that is protected by law and which is contained in an
electronic computer, its system or network.10 The
Criminal Code of Georgia does not provide for any
clause about special objects, but it would be better if
the Criminal Code of Georgia specifies a computer
system as serving state interests as the object of special
protection of a computer crime, in a similar way as that
of the criminal laws of other countries.11
Applying the provisions of this article in practice may
be difficult. To refer to unauthorized access to legally
protected computer information (digital data), it is
necessary to know what constitutes information in
general, and what is meant by computer information.
Information is a Latin word and means, in essence,
‘acquainting’, ‘conveying’ (in English, it is from the old
French ‘enformacion’, ‘informacion’ and the Latin
‘information-em’). There are many ways of interpreting
information, and it is remarkable that the legal
interpretation of an issue is impossible without a
philosophical consideration of the meaning of
‘information’. In philosophic literature, mainly
attributive and functional concepts are used for defining
information. Proponents of the first concept consider
that information is an intrinsic feature of a material
object, while others do not admit the existence of such
information. There are many interesting opinions about
this issue, but the legal interpretation of ‘information’ is
the most important for the purposes of this article. From
the legal point of view, information is data representing
the subject of legal relations in the process of
communicating (receiving, saving, processing, and
transmitting) and may become the basis of the creation
or termination of any legal obligation.12
It is possible that documents, databases,
informational resources, and information arrays all
contain information (digital data). Only confidential
information is protected by the law. This means that an
offense is only committed when a person obtains access
to or modifies confidential information.
According to the current legislation of Georgia, the
following areas are protected by law: state secrets
(paragraph 1 of article 1 of the Law of Georgia “On State
Secrets”); commercial secrets (article 272 of the
General Administrative Code of Georgia), personal
secrets, where what constitutes a personal secret is
determined by the information, except as otherwise
prescribed by the law (article 27 of the General
Administrative Code of Georgia), and tax secrets
pursuant to the Order of the Minister of Finance of
Georgia “On approval of Instruction of compartmenting
information containing tax secret and secret clearance”;
this includes data about the tax payer from the moment
the tax payer registers with the tax office, covering
letters, orders issued for checking tax payers, tax
inspection reports, letters of encashment, taxation files,
and the tax payers’ register.
The term “unauthorized” implies that the perpetrator
acts without permission of the owner of the computer,
its system or the network owner. The term “access”
should be explained as a person’s efforts to carry out
certain actions and as a result, interferes or influences
the process of processing information without authority.
The action may be either simple – direct physical access
to the computer, or technical – penetration into the
computer network through the internet by means of
various software tools. To prove unauthorized access, a
causal relationship must necessarily exist between the
act and the result. But it can be very difficult to establish
such a link. For example, assume a perpetrator steals
the password of a bank system by obtaining access to
the system when physically located in Israel. Later,
another person uses the password in Georgia and
produces a forged credit card, which is then used by
another person to undertake transactions in a number
of shops. In this example, damage is incurred upon the
lawful owner of the card, the bank and each shop. The
causal relationship can be established in the following
manner: the person who stole the password by
obtaining access to the banking system without
authority will have committed an offense as stipulated
by article 284. The production and use of a forged card
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represents another offense as provided for by article
210 of the Criminal Code.13 Thus, although the chain of
crimes began with the theft of the password, the person
who obtained the password by obtaining access to the
banking system without authority has not committed
the illegal transaction in the shop.
The subjective aspect of the crime provided for by
article 284 is expressed in direct intent, because the
disposition of the Article is based on the term
“unauthorized access”. As the word “access” implies
certain efforts to carry out certain actions to the
detriment of the owner of the computer, its system or
network, it means that this action can be committed
only with direct intent.14 However, in some cases there
may be no direct intent in regard to the results of an
action. For example, assume a person penetrates into a
database in order to find out the flight time of the
President of the country. Assume his purpose is neither
to block, nor delete the information, nor do any other
action that comes within the provisions of article 284 of
the Criminal Code of Georgia. Assume the aim is to
prepare and carry out a terrorist attack. It is difficult to
classify this example as the crime set out under article
284. This is because the offense does not provide for
obtaining unauthorized access for the purposes of
committing other crime.
It might usefully be mentioned that before ratification
of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime,
many countries associated a criminal act with the result
of unauthorized access. By way of example, under the
Council of Europe Convention and Council Framework
Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24 February 2005 on attacks
against information systems,15 article 2 provides as
follows:
Article 2 Illegal access to information systems
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary
measures to ensure that the intentional access
without right to the whole or any part of an
information system is punishable as a criminal
offence, at least for cases which are not minor.
2. Each Member State may decide that the conduct
referred to in paragraph 1 is incriminated only
where the offence is committed by infringing a
security measure.
Some Member States of the European Union have
implemented this article by imposing criminal liability
for unauthorized access to information systems only if it
results in damage of information. Latvia is one such
example, as provided for under section 241 of the
Criminal law:16
Section 241. Arbitrarily Accessing Automated Data
Processing Systems
(1) For a person who commits arbitrarily (without the
relevant permission or utilising the rights granted to
another person) accessing an automated data
processing system or a part thereof, if breaching of
data processing protective systems is associated
therewith or if significant harm is caused thereby,
the applicable sentence is deprivation of liberty for a
term not exceeding three years or community service,
or a fine not exceeding fifty times the minimum
monthly wage.
(2) For a person who commits the same acts, if
commission thereof is for purposes of acquiring
property or if serious consequences are caused
thereby,
the applicable sentence is deprivation of liberty for a
term not exceeding five year or custodial arrest, or
community service, or a fine not exceeding one
hundred times the minimum monthly wage, with or
without confiscation of property.
(3) For a person who commits the acts provided for in
Paragraph one of this Section, if they are directed
against the State information system,
13 The printing, spreading or use of forged credit or
pay cards – Criminal Code of Georgia, Chapter
XXVII “Crimes in Monetary-Credit System”, Article
210.
14 See Daniel Bilar, ‘Known knowns, known
unknowns and unknown unknowns: anti-virus
issues, malicious software and internet attacks for
non-technical audiences’ Digital Evidence and
Electronic Signature Law Review, 6 (2009) pp 123 –
131.
15 OJ L69, 16.3.2005, p. 67–71.
16 Adopted 17.06.1998, effective since 01.04.1999
[17.06.1998. likums “KriminÇllikums” (“LV”,
199/200 (1260/1261)].
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17 This is taken, with permission, from a paper by
Stephen Mason, ‘The implementation of
Community regulations in national legislation: IT
offences in the strict sense of the word and
offences committed using IT’, prepared to support
a talk by the author during a seminar entitled
Investigation, Prosecution and Judgment of
Information Technology Crime: Legal framework
and criminal policy in the European Union. The
seminar was held for members of the judiciary
(judges and public prosecutors) specializing in
dealing with cybercrime, organized within the
framework of the European Judicial Training
Network (with financial support from the
Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security
of the European Commission (2007 Criminal
Justice Programme) and the Federal Public Service
Justice (Belgium)) between Tuesday 25 November
2008 and Friday 28 November 2008 at the Hôtel
Jean de Bohême, Durbuy, Belgium, and the full
paper is available at http://www.stephenmason.eu
/training-for-lawyers/judicial-training/.
18 Report from the Commission to the Council based
on Article 12 of the Council Framework Decision of
24 February 2005 on attacks against information
systems 14.7.2008, /* COM/2008/0448 final */,
paragraph 2.3.
19 For a discussion in the US context, see Scott
Eltringham, Editor in Chief, Prosecuting Computer
Crimes Manual, Part 1 Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (Computer Crime and Intellectual Property
Section, Criminal Division, United States
Department of Justice, February 2007), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ccman
ual/index.html.
20 Interestingly in the UK, the Computer Misuse Act
1990 (as amended by The Police and Justice Act
2006, s 36), provides, in section 3, for the
following, which includes recklessness:
3 Unauthorised acts with intent to impair, or with
recklessness as to impairing, operation of
computer, etc.
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if—
(a) he does any unauthorised act in relation to a
computer;
(b) at the time when he does the act he knows
that it is unauthorised; and
(c) either subsection (2) or subsection (3) below
applies.
(2) This subsection applies if the person intends
by doing the act—
(a) to impair the operation of any computer;
(b) to prevent or hinder access to any program or
data held in any computer;
(c) to impair the operation of any such program or
the reliability of any such data; or
(d) to enable any of the things mentioned in
paragraphs (a) to (c) above to be done.
(3) This subsection applies if the person is
reckless as to whether the act will do any of the
things mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (d) of
subsection (2) above.
(4) The intention referred to in subsection (2)
above, or the recklessness referred to in
subsection (3) above, need not relate to—
(a) any particular computer;
(b) any particular program or data; or
(c) a program or data of any particular kind.
(5) In this section—
(a) a reference to doing an act includes a reference
to causing an act to be done;
(b) “act” includes a series of acts;
(c) a reference to impairing, preventing or
hindering something includes a reference to
doing so temporarily.
the applicable sentence is deprivation of liberty for a
term not exceeding eight years or a fine not exceeding
one hundred and eighty times the minimum monthly
wage.
[12 February 2004]17
In a report from the Commission to the Council on
article 12, it was noted that in Austria, criminal
responsibility requires intent to perpetrate data
espionage and to use the data obtained in order to
make a profit or to cause damage; in the Czech
Republic, criminal liability only occurrs where there is
illegal access and where the data are subsequently
misused or damaged, and in Finland, the requirement
for criminal responsibility is that the data must be
‘endangered’.18
Applying the elements of the offence
In this section, consideration will be given to the
situation where a hacker has obtained access to the
airport database to find out the President’s flight
schedule for the purpose of a terrorist attack on the
President. Assume the hacker has obtained the flight
schedule of the President, and also assume that the
hacker mistakenly deletes this information and a
number of files containing other information. Given the
facts of such a case, it is correct to refer to the
perpetrator’s recklessness as a result of the
unauthorized access. The perpetrator may not always
have direct intent, but they may have been reckless or
negligent.
Naturally, unauthorized access to a computer is
unimaginable without direct intent, although a person
can obtain access with authority, and then undertake
actions that go beyond the authority granted to them.19
This raises the question as to the nature of the action
required to be proven for it to be classified under the
Criminal Code of Georgia. Section 4 of article 10 of the
Code provide that “an unintentional act shall be
considered as a crime only if the relevant article of this
Code so provides”. Unfortunately, article 284 does not
contain such clause,20 although article 11 of the Code
provides as follows:
Article 11. Liability for a crime of aforethought with
attendant consequences
1. If a criminal law provides for an increase in the
punishment where the consequences were not within
the remit of the intent, then such an increase shall be
permitted only if a person caused the consequences
through negligence. Such action shall constitute a
crime of aforethought.
2. Other qualifying features of the crime of
aforethought shall be attributed to the accused only it
was part of the intention of this person.
This interpretation can be useful only in regard to the
aggravating circumstances as stipulated by paragraph 3
of article 284, which implies the grave consequence
caused by any action stipulated by paragraph 2 and the
criminal liability is increased for it. Thus, if a person
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carries out actions that blocks, destroys or erases digital
information as a result of unauthorized access to
computer information protected by law, and these
actions are committed under the circumstances
stipulated by paragraph 2 of Article 284 and entail a
grave consequence, and the perpetrator was reckless as
to occurrence of such consequence, it will be considered
as a deliberate crime. Where a person has committed
the action set out in paragraph 1 of article 284, and
acted recklessly or negligently as to the consequences,
it appears that no deliberate crime has been committed,
and his actions cannot be classified as a crime in
accordance with article 284, because article 284 does
not contain a clause for similar cases. The opinion
provided in the comments to the “Private Part of
Criminal Law” is also worth mentioning: “As for the
subjective elements of computer crimes, the elements
stipulated by articles 284 and 285 imply intent. Though
there also may be recklessness as to grave
consequence, but in a whole such crime shall be
considered a deliberate crime”.21 Therefore, the action
stipulated by article 10 of the Criminal Code of Georgia
cannot be considered as a crime, except when a person
was reckless as to the gravity of the consequences.22
The provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on
Cybercrime tend to accentuate the subjective elements
of the crime. For example, the damaging, deletion,
deterioration, alteration or suppression of computer
data cannot be committed unintentionally (this is
stipulated by article 4 of the Convention):
Article 4 – Data interference
1 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other
measures as may be necessary to establish as
criminal offences under its domestic law, when
committed intentionally, the damaging, deletion,
deterioration, alteration or suppression of computer
data without right.
2 A Party may reserve the right to require that the
conduct described in paragraph 1 result in serious
harm.
This is similar to the offence set out in article 5 of the
Convention on Cybercrime:
Article 5 – System interference
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other
measures as may be necessary to establish as
criminal offences under its domestic law, when
committed intentionally, the serious hindering without
right of the functioning of a computer system by
inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting,
deteriorating, altering or suppressing computer data.
Aiding or abetting
The Convention on Cybercrime (article 11) and the
Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24 February 2005
on attacks against information systems (article 5) sets
out an obligation to consider the issue of liability of
persons attempting, aiding or abetting each of the
substantive acts when a perpetrator acts intentionally.
In this respect, the Criminal Code of Georgia follows the
Convention, in that article 25 of the Criminal Code
provides for liability of the immediate executor and
accomplice (aider and abettor):
Article 25. Liability of Perpetrator and Accomplice
1. Criminal liability shall be imposed upon the
principal, aider or abettor only in respect of their own
actions on the basis of joint illegal action, by taking
into account the character and quality of the part that
each of them played in the wrongdoing.
2. The criminal liability of the principal, aider or
abettor shall be determined on the basis of the
relevant article of this Code without reference to this
article.
3. The criminal liability of the principal, aider or
abettor shall be determined on the basis of the
relevant article of this Code by reference to that
article, except in those cases where principal, aider or
abettor at the same time have been immediate co-
executors.
21 M. Lekveishvili, G. Mamulashvili, N. Todua and
N.Gvenetadze, Private Part of Criminal Law Book 1,
(Meridian, Tbilisi, 2005), p. 613.
22 An unofficial translation of article 10:
Article 10. Unintentional crime
1. An act shall be deemed to be a crime of
negligence if it is perpetrated through a
presumption or recklessly.
2. An act perpetrated through presumption occurs
where the person was aware that the action
was foreseeable, and foresaw the possibility of
the illegal consequence, but had an unfounded
hope that he or she would avoid this
consequence.
3. An act is committed recklessly where the person
was aware that the action was foreseeable, and
did not foresee the possibility that the illegal
consequence might occur, although had he or
she had given any thought to the
consequences, they were able to foresee it.
4. An act committed recklessly shall be deemed to
be an offence only if the relevant article of this
Code so provides.
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4. If the actions of the principal, aider or abettor
involves actions that are relevant in respect of the
wrongful act, then such actions shall give rise to the
liability of the other principal, aider or abettor whose
actions are not relevant in respect of the wrongful act
if the latter principal, aider or abettor was aware of
the actions of the other.
5. The personal feature, which is characteristic for the
wrongdoing or the personality of one of the
principals, aiders or abettors, shall be charged against
the principal, aider or abettor who is characterized by
that feature.
6. A person may be held responsible for complicity in
a crime as an organizer, instigator or accomplice for
participating in the crime as a special subject of the
relevant crime prescribed by this Code.
7. If the perpetrator has not completed the crime, the
accomplice shall be subject to criminal liability for the
preparation of or complicity in the attempted crime.
Criminal liability for the preparation of the crime shall
be imposed upon the one who failed, due to
circumstances beyond their control, to persuade other
person into wrongdoing.
The Framework Decision also establishes liability for a
crime committed by an organized group (article 7).
Austria, Denmark, Finland and Portugal have not
considered amendments connected with organized
groups.23 As for the Swedish legislation, a crime
committed within an organized group is considered as
an aggravating circumstance and is embraced by the
term “grave crime”.
Legal entities
Both the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime
(article 12) and the Council of Europe Framework
Decision (articles 8 and 9) provides for the criminal
liability of a legal entity.24
Generally, the Criminal Code of Georgia stipulates
liability for legal entities, but in the list of articles listing
the criminal acts for which liability of legal entities may
arise (article 1072 of the Criminal Code of Georgia),
articles 284-286 are not mentioned, in contrast to
article 3241 regarding cybercrime. This is one more
inconsistency with the Council of Europe Convention on
Cybercrime, and Georgian legislators will have to
consider correcting this deficiency. Other countries have
taken different approaches in Europe in respect to the
issue of liability of a legal entity. In France and Estonia,
it is considered that this issue should be governed by
civil law, but Denmark, Finland and Portugal have not
established criminal liability of legal entities.25
Section 2 of article 284 of the Criminal Code of
Georgia has provided for aggravating circumstances
where a person has obtained unauthorized access to
legally protected computer information, which are as
follows:
2. The same action performed by:
a) a group of persons in prior agreement;
b) the abuse of an official position;
c) a person having access to electronic  
computers, their systems or networks,-
Malicious code
Under paragraph 1 of article 285 of the Criminal Code of
Georgia the following is punishable (the entire article is
reproduced here):
Article 285. Production, use or circulation of
detrimental electronic computer programs
1. The creation of detrimental electronic computer
programs or the introduction of changes into current
programs that result in erasing, blocking, modifying,
copying information or disturbing the work of
electronic computers, their systems or networks, as
well as use or spread of such programs or machine
carriers with them,-
shall be punishable by a fine or by corrective labour
for up to three years in length or by a term of
imprisonment similar in length.
2. The same actions entailed grave consequences are
punished with imprisonment within the term from
three to five years.
Paragraph 2 provides that the same action that gives
23 Report from the Commission to the Council based
on Article 12 of the Council Framework Decision of
24 February 2005 on attacks against information
systems 14.7.2008, /* COM/2008/0448 final */,
paragraphs 2.6 and 2.7.
24 For a translation of the Convention on Cybercrime
by G. Lanchava and G. Ortoidze, (2008, Tbilisi) see
http://www.cybercrime.ge.
25 Report from the Commission to the Council based
on Article 12 of the Council Framework Decision of
24 February 2005 on attacks against information
systems 14.7.2008, /* COM/2008/0448 final */,
paragraph 2.8.
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rise to grave consequences is an aggravating
circumstance. There is no similar liability in the Council
of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, which might be
considered a deficiency of this document, rather than of
the Criminal Code of Georgia. However, article 6 of the
Convention provides as follows:
Article 6 – Misuse of devices
1 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and
other measures as may be necessary to establish as
criminal offences under its domestic law, when
committed intentionally and without right:
a the production, sale, procurement for use, import,
distribution or otherwise making available of:
i a device, including a computer program,
designed or adapted primarily for the
purpose of committing any of the offences
established in accordance with Articles 2
through 5;
ii a computer password, access code, or similar
data by which the whole or any part of a
computer system is capable of being
accessed,
with intent that it be used for the purpose of
committing any of the offences established in
Articles 2 through 5; and
b the possession of an item referred to in
paragraphs a.i or ii above, with intent that it be
used for the purpose of committing any of the
offences established in Articles 2 through 5. A
Party may require by law that a number of such
items be possessed before criminal liability
attaches.
2 This article shall not be interpreted as
imposing criminal liability where the production, sale,
procurement for use, import, distribution or otherwise
making available or possession referred to in
paragraph 1 of this article is not for the purpose of
committing an offence established in accordance with
Articles 2 through 5 of this Convention, such as for the
authorised testing or protection of a computer
system.
Article 4 of the Convention covers the establishment of
criminal liability for damaging, deletion, deterioration,
alteration or suppression of computer data. It can
therefore be concluded that these articles taken
together include the use of malicious software,
although it is arguable whether the creation of
malicious software is an independent crime and should
be defined under a separate article in domestic laws.
From the analysis of disposition of article 285 of the
Criminal Code of Georgia, it appears that if copying or
modifying computer information is carried out by a
program which does not damage the electronic
computer, there will be no crime. Nevertheless, there
are programs (for example, certain types of Trojan
horse) which do not damage a computer but provide its
creator with a control console to the system to which it
will be sent and activated. Where the Criminal Code of
Georgia provides that a perpetrator deals with digital
data by means of malicious software, it appears that
there is no criminal act under the provisions of article
285.
The offences under article 286
Article 286 of the Criminal Code of Georgia provides as
follows:
1. The violation of an electronic computer, system or
network operating rules on the part of a person who
had access to electronic computers, their systems or
networks, that results in deleting, blocking, modifying
or copying legally protected computer information or
causes considerable damage,-
shall be punishable with a fine, or by socially useful
works from one hundred and eighty to two hundred
hours in length or by restriction of freedom for up to
two years in length, by deprivation of the right to
occupy a position or pursue a particular activity for
the term not in excess of three years or without it.
2. The same action entailed grave consequences is
punished with imprisonment within the term from two
to four years.
A significant problem with the drafting of article 286 is
that it provides for the establishment of criminal liability
for the violation of certain rules, but it is unclear what is
meant by the network operating rules, because such
rules have not been established.
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The offences under article 3241
Article 3241 of the Criminal Code of Georgia stipulates
criminal liability for cyber terrorism:
1. Cyber terrorism, i.e. illegal seizure, the use or threat
of use of cyber information protected by law, that
creates the threat of giving rise to grave
consequence, undermines public security, strategic,
political or economic interest, perpetrated to
intimidate the population or put pressure upon a
governmental body,
- shall bear the legal consequences of
imprisonment ranging from ten to fifteen years in
length.
2.The same action that has claimed a human life or
has given rise to any grave consequence,
- shall be punishable by prison sentences ranging
from twelve to twenty years in length or by life
imprisonment.
Note: The legal person shall be punished with the
winding-up or deprivation of the right to pursue
activities and a fine for the crimes envisaged by the
given article.
This article represents a formally defined crime, and will
be considered as consummated immediately from the
moment of illegal seizure or the use or threat of the use
of information protected by law, although it is unclear
why using information illegally acquired by citizen A on
the part of citizen B may represent a computer crime. It
would be easier to classify the act performed by A as
unauthorized access (article 284 of the Criminal Code)
and the act performed by B as a terrorist act (article 323
of the Criminal Code). Where it is proved that there was
a relevant interconnection between them, it would be
possible to punish A and B for participation in
committing a terrorist act. It seems that the legislator
has not analyzed how article 3241 can be applied,
because it is difficult to define computer information
“protected by law” under the Georgian legislation, and
arguably it is better to punish a person who has
committed cyber terrorism for committing a terrorist act
stipulated by article 323 (Terrorist Acts) of the Criminal
Code, rather than to attempt to detect elements of
computer crime, than collect evidence and finally argue
for a justified judgment of conviction. Unfortunately, the
threat of using computer information protected by law
may have no connection with obtaining access to
computer information and committing computer crime
in general. Even if it were not so, the legislator’s
purpose in regard to amending the Code by adding
article 3241 seems strange, because paragraph 1 of
article 323 provides as follows:
Article 323. Terrorist Act
1. Terrorist act, i.e. explosion, arson, application
of arms or any other action giving rise to threat of a
person’s death, substantial property damage or any
other grave consequence and undermines public
security, strategic, political or economic interests of
the state, perpetrated to intimidate the population or
put pressure upon a governmental body,-
shall be punishable by prison sentences ranging from
ten to fifteen years in length. 
This article provides for the same purposes, and it does
not matter how this act is committed, by what means
and methods. Article 3241 accentuates a terrorist act
committed by the seizure of computer information
protected by law or its using or the threat of its use.
Arguably, the latter is directly embraced by “or any
other action” specified in article 323. Thus, the
provisions of article 3241 do not necessarily help the
authorities, because it is makes it more difficult to bring
a cyber terrorist to justice. Another issue arises: if
groups of people commit a terrorist act, and do so
repeatedly, is considered an aggravating circumstance,
the same aggravating circumstance ought to be for
cyber terrorism as well. Also, the Note to article 323
provides for exemption from criminal liability where the
person participating in the preparation of a terrorist act
gives a timely notice to a governmental body or, by
acting in another way, helps to prevent the terrorist
act.26 It is to be questioned as to why the same defence
does not apply to enable a person to avoid liability for
cyber terrorism, especially as the objects of
26 The note reads (unofficial translation): ‘Note:
Criminal liability shall be lifted from the person
participating in the preparation of the terrorist act
where they give a timely notice to a governmental
body or acts otherwise, in such a way that their
notice will help stave off the terrorist act, in
circumstance where his or her action bears no
other signs of criminal behaviour.’
PROBLEMS OF LEGAL REGULATION AND INVESTIGATION OF COMPUTER CRIMES IN GEORGIA
62 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 7 © Pario Communications Limited, 2010
undermining and the goals of a terrorist act and cyber
terrorism are identical.
Ratification of the Convention on Cybercrime 
At the time of writing this article, work is underway in
Georgia to ratify the Council of Europe Convention on
Cybercrime. Legislative amendments are planned to be
made to the Criminal Code of Georgia as well as the
Georgian Code of Criminal Procedure. It is difficult to say
how the articles of the Convention will be integrated
into the Georgian legislation, but obviously it is
expected that this process will overcome the
deficiencies discussed above, and significantly improve
the legal framework for dealing with computer crime.
Against the background of the discussions in this
article, it becomes evident that it is difficult to classify a
crime under the criminal norms currently applied in
practice. Moreover, no Georgian investigator, prosecutor
or judge has any special knowledge or special
instructions of how to interpret or apply a norm in
relation to the cyber offences, and it remains very
difficult to explain the gravity, character and even the
“grave consequence” resulting from cybercrimes. This
problem is demonstrated by an analysis of the Georgian
investigative practice and the deplorable statistics of
the law enforcement authorities.
Cyber attacks against Georgia
There is a significant problem facing Georgia at present
– there is no unified cyber security strategy, few
computer crime research centers, little coordination
between specialists working in the high-tech field and
internet providers – these and many other reasons
facilitated the successful cyber attacks against Georgia
in July and August 2008.27 After similar attacks against
Estonia in April 2007, a research center was founded in
Georgia with the assistance of a number of member
states of NATO (Germany, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Italy and Spain) which began its activities in August
2008. The problem with cybercrimes is indicated by the
fact that the authorities in Georgia failed to undertake
prosecutions for the cyber attacks that occurred against
Georgian web sites in July and August.
Although article 22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
requires a prosecutor or investigator to undertake
proceedings if there are grounds for doing so, it is not
only necessary to identify the perpetrator of the attacks.
The authorities also need the resources and knowledge
to pursue the investigation against those responsible
for the attacks. It can be considered that many practical
issues, as well as the ill-defined state of the Criminal
Code, is far from satisfactory in Georgia. The problem is,
that the computer crime-related problems discussed in
this article are arguably caused by the wrong approach
to this issue in Georgia. In particular, computer crime
has never been the subject of a thorough study by
Georgian scientists. It is to be hoped that the recent
cyber attacks against Georgia should provide an
impetus for scientists working in this field to ensure
their research is more profound, and for the state to
change its cyber security strategy.
Computer crime investigations in Georgia 
The investigation of computer crimes is a complicated
problem for the Georgian law enforcement authorities,
and the establishment of an anti-cybercrime division
has not resolved the problems. This is illustrated in a
case completed by the Judicial Division for Criminal
Cases, Tbilisi Regional Court on 19 May 2004 with a
judgment. Several persons were accused of committing
actions stipulated by articles 180, 202, 210, 362,
paragraph “a”, section 2 and section 3 of article 284 of
the Criminal Code of Georgia. For the purposes of this
article, the investigation carried out in respect with the
crime committed under article 284 will be considered,
and the evidence obtained to prove the offence will be
reviewed.
The judicial decision of the Tbilisi Regional Court
of 19 May 2004 (case No 1/a-74)
This was a criminal action of Z. Tsinadze, Sh. Gogua and
R. Manasherov.28 It was expressed as follows (the facts
are taken from the judgment):
Joint Stock Company (JSC) “IntellectBank” and JSC
“Bank of Georgia” had concluded MasterCard credit
card service agreements with casinos registered and
operating in Georgia – Casinos “Adjara”, “Flamingo”,
“Aragvi”, “Victoria”, “Europe” and other economic
entities under which card transactions were carried
27 For more information about the attacks, which
preceded the physical invasion of Georgia, see the
two reports entitled ‘Russia/Georgia Cyber War–
Findings and Analysis’, Project Grey Goose: Phase
I Report (Project Grey Goose, 17 October 2008) and
‘Project Grey Goose Phase II Report: The evolving
state of cyber warfare’ (March 20, 2009 greylogic).
28 Z. Tsinadze was arrested pursuant to paragraph A
part 2 Article 284 for the crime he committed
under Part 3 of this Article. R. Manasherov, who
was suspected of committing the same action,
was found not guilty, but he was given a
conditional sentence because of other criminal
actions committed during his activities in the
criminal group mentioned in the case. The
remaining members of the group also went to trial
(Judgment of Tbilisi City Court, file No 1/a – 74,
May 19, 2004, page 83-85).
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out via point of sale terminals installed in each
organization. Corresponding amounts were
reimbursed to the legal entities by JSC “IntellectBank”
and JSC “Bank of Georgia” from the funds transferred
under the auspices of MasterCard.
Between September and October 2002, Georgian
citizens Z. Tsinadze and R. Manasherov, Israeli citizen
L. Zaitpudin and another unidentified person who was
in possession of a forged identification document in
the name of L. Mosashvili (obtained by prior
arrangement for the purposes of unlawful
misappropriation of property), intended to open card
accounts at the Georgian banking institutions to
receive MasterCard credit cards. Their intention was to
illegally obtain access to computer information
protected by law, and then unlawfully obtain and use
information containing bank secrets, and authorize
the transfer of credit amounts from foreign bank
accounts into the credit cards issued to them, and
then misappropriate the money by means of
computer manipulation – “hacker operations”, and to
print forged credit cards and to misappropriate money
from legal card owners by using them at non-banking
facilities.
To execute the criminal act, Z. Tsinadze, by prior
arrangement with other members of the group,
received a MasterCard credit card from JSC
“IntellectBank” on the basis of an agreement dated 7
November 2002. On the same day, Z. Tsinadze
received two credit cards from the MasterCard system
at the JSC “Bank of Georgia”.
Simultaneously, Z. Tsinadze, R. Manasherov, R.
Zaitpudin and L. Mosashvili decided to purchase
computer equipment that would provide connection
to the internet. The intention was to obtain illegal
access to computer information protected by law, and
to collect and use secret bank information for the
purposes of their scheme to steal money. For this
purpose, with the help of a friend of Z. Tsinadze, O.
Alphaidze, they became acquainted with A. Dzidziguri,
who had been working as a typesetter on the
newspaper Akhali Versia. Dzidziguri had a good
knowledge of computer equipment and was able to
arrange, install and operate computer networks. A.
Dzidziguri purchased two units of computer
equipment for this purpose, and installed them in a
house rented by L. Zaitpudin located in Chavchavadze
Street.
After completion of all preparatory works, L. Zaitpudin
offered to assist A. Dzidziguri in crediting amounts
from foreign banking institutions to Georgia via the
internet and printing forged credit cards, but the latter
refused this offer of help. Nonetheless, Z. Tsinadze, R.
Manasherov, L. Zaitpudin and a certain L. Mosashvili
managed to obtain access to computer information
protected by law and obtained data containing bank
secrets of a number of foreign institutions reflected in
the networks identified with the aid of other
unidentified persons. They then repeatedly credited
US$98,728.40 (by non-bank transfers) from various
US facilities into the MasterCard credit card owned by
Z. Tsinadze at JSC “IntellectBank” from 25 November
to 11 December 2002 via the internet.
Z. Tsinadze then proceeded to cash US$2,000 at two
ATMs of JSC “Bank of Georgia” on the next day (26
November 2002), although Z. Tsinadze and his
accomplices failed to cash the remaining amount,
because JSC “IntellectBank” refused to cash the
amounts and blocked their credit card on the grounds
that the credit operations were carried out as a result
of forged transactions. The conspirators could not
cash the amounts credited into the credit cards from
banking institutions as a result of the forged
transactions. This meant that the perpetrators
changed the form of their criminal action, and decided
to print forged credit cards of the MasterCard system
which could be used at non-banking institutions such
as casinos, supermarkets and other trade facilities.
L. Zaitpudin subsequently illegally purchased and
brought to Georgia special equipment which was
used for changing and falsifying the magnetic field for
credit cards of the MasterCard system. At the same
time, Z. Tsinadze disclosed his intent to Sh. Gogua,
and involved him in the criminal activities. The
perpetrators systematically printed forged credit
cards using the credit card printing equipment,
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collected information containing bank secrets by
obtaining illegal access to computer networks, and
changed the record of the magnetic field using this
information. They entered the credit card numbers of
those foreign citizens in whose name certain amounts
of money were deposited at relevant banking
institutions in the magnetic field of the credit cards
issued by JSC “Bank of Georgia” and JSC
“IntellectBank” in the name of Z. Tsinadze and L.
Mosashvili. The perpetrators fraudulently used the
forged credit cards at various facilities after which
they misappropriated large amounts owned by legal
holders of these cards.
Initially, criminal proceedings were instituted based on
these facts on 28 February 2003 under articles 210 and
180 of the Criminal Code of Georgia. The grounds for the
proceedings were based on the fraudulent
misappropriation of funds by forged credit cards. Those
investigating the crime arrested the suspect Z. Tsinadze
and seized forged credit cards from him.
The investigation then led towards it being linked to a
computer crime after receiving a letter from the
International Legal Service29 on 13 June 2003 informing
the investigators that the US Federal Bureau of
Investigation was investigating the illegal transactions
with credit cards, and requested the authorities to
provide relevant information regarding the credit card of
the MasterCard system issued by JSC “IntellectBank”
(the credit card number was also specified in the letter),
the identity of the person in whose name the card was
issued, the list of amounts deposited into the card, the
location of withdrawal and the amount of money
withdrawn.
On 17 June 2003, Georgian law enforcement agencies
received a letter from US FBI investigator M. Kirbins,
stating that the FBI was carrying out an investigation on
the case of yet unidentified persons in Salt Lake City
who stole credit card numbers from an American
company “IronGate” (unfortunately, no specific
information is provided in the text of judgement about
the company “IronGate” apart from its name). These
persons illegally penetrated into computer system of
the internet company, copied the card-related
information, and credited the amounts into their own
credit cards accounts. One of the credit cards was
issued by JSC “IntellectBank” in Georgia. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation requested the authorities to
provide information about this investigation, together
with the MasterCard credit card issued by JSC
“IntellectBank” (the credit card number was also
specified in the letter).30
The Georgian investigators provided this information
to the American investigators on the following day. By
that time, the investigation had established that the
credit cards requested by the FBI belonged to Z.
Tsinadze. On 15 July 2003, the Georgian investigators
sent a letter to M. Kirbins informing him of the detention
of the suspects R. Manasherov and Z. Tsinadze, and
asked him to share his experience in computer
technologies and requested assistance. On 15
September 2003, the Georgian investigators again
wrote to M. Kirbins informing him that the General
Prosecution Office of Georgia was investigating a
criminal case of fraudulent misappropriation of property
as a result of printing and using forged credit cards and
obtaining information from computers. The letter
contained a request for assistance, provision of
information about the credit cards opened in Georgia
and into which suspicious amounts were deposited by
means of the hacker operations. It is noteworthy that M.
Kirbins did not reply to any of these letters. This is
confirmed by an explanation made by one US Embassy
employee on 30 October 2003.31
The law enforcement agencies were provided with the
grounds to investigate the case under article 284.
Although further evidence was necessary, the
perpetrators were directly accused of the crime
stipulated by article 284 of the Criminal Code, together
with other crimes in the indictment dated 3 November
2003. The only thing the investigators were certain of
was that a certain A. Dzidziguri installed computer
equipment on behalf of the perpetrators. This is
established from the interrogation protocols of A.
Dzidziguri.32
The investigation of computer crimes is distinguished
by a number of specific characteristics that exceed the
knowledge of an investigator having a standard
education in law. From the detailed study of this case, it
is evident that the investigators classified the action
under article 284 without any legal grounds. Paragraph
1 of article 284 provides that ‘Unauthorized access to
29 ‘The International Legal Service’ is mentioned in
the text of the judgment and no other information
is provided about this entity. It is assumed to be
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, because
the letter could have reached the investigation via
this Ministry.
30 Investigative practice of the General Prosecutor’s
Office, file number 1a-74, vol.4, pp. 93-95.
31 Investigative practice of the General Prosecutor’s
Office, file number 1a-74, vol.5, p. 175.
32 Investigative practice of the General Prosecutor’s
Office, file number 1a-74, vol.4, pp. 174-184.
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Although it is almost six years since the
investigation of this case, it remains difficult
to find an investigator in Georgia who has the
capacity to conduct a proper investigation. 
computer information protected by law stored in
electronic computers, their systems or networks or on
the machine carriers that causes the erasure, blocking,
modifying or obtaining data, or disturbing the work of
electronic computers, their systems or networks’, and
this means the investigators were under an obligation
to establish the following facts: unauthorized access to
computer information, system or network; the date and
time of this took place; the place of access to the
system or network; the reliability of the means of
protecting the computer information; how the accused
gained illegal access; the amount of loss incurred, and
the circumstances contributing to the crime.
In this case, those investigating the crime should have
requested, at the very minimum from the American
company “IronGate”, the runtime journal, list of IP
addresses recorded in their server, and technical data
relating to protecting the information stored on their
computer to establish the fact of illegal access to their
computer information, system or network. At the same
time, the investigators should have become interested
in the whereabouts of the computer equipment used by
the perpetrators, and if found, they should have
inspected and searched it together and with the
assistance of digital evidence specialists, to establish
whether it was possible to obtain access to the
computer or networks that were attacked from these
computers.
The investigators should have established whether
the perpetrators had any e-mail addresses and if such
existed, they should have checked the incoming
messages on the basis of the judge’s order, because it is
possible that the criminals did not steal the credit cards
themselves by means of unauthorized access, but
received them from other persons, especially when
there was evidence that L. Mosashvili was receiving the
printable credit card details from international
telephone calls. This fact is established from the
protocol of additional interrogation of A. Dzidziguri.33
The investigators failed to follow up the long distance
calls, although such evidence had a great importance
for the investigation of the case. The investigators
should also have identified the telephone number and
the internet service provider through which the
perpetrators were connected to the internet. 
From the letter of M. Kirbins, is becomes evident that
the perpetrators were using numbers of credit cards
stolen from “IronGate” for printing forged cards. Apart
from this, the judicial records include a letter from an
American company called First Data Corporation, which
is attached to the case, which confirms that a total of
US$98,000.00 was deposited to the credit card of Z.
Tsinadze between 21 November 2002 and 9 December
2002, and which was stolen, although neither this fact
nor any other evidence in the case disclose the identity
of the immediate executor of the unauthorized access,
the place and date and time of the unauthorized access,
etc. This meant that the available information was not
sufficient to accuse a person of committing an action
under article 284. The investigation should have
requested relevant information from the affected
company first, and then should have conducted
sufficient checks to ensure the information could be
relied upon.
Although it is almost six years since the investigation
of this case, it remains difficult to find an investigator in
Georgia who has the capacity to conduct a proper
investigation. The discussion in this article
demonstrates the lack of preparedness of Georgian law
enforcement bodies to deal with cybercrimes, and this
represents the most significant problem in dealing
effectively with computer crimes in Georgia, together
with the lack of a sound legal framework.34
33 Investigative practice of the General Prosecutor’s
Office, file number 1a-74, vol.4, pp. 252-257.
34 Arguably, some police forces in the United States
of America have proved to be as inept in handling
cases dealing with digital evidence, for which see
the in-depth analysis of State of Connecticut v. Julie
Amero (Docket number CR-04-93292; Superior
Court, New London Judicial District at Norwich, GA
21; 3, 4 and 5 January 2007) by Stephen Mason
(gen ed), International Electronic Evidence (British
Institute of International and Comparative Law,
2008), pp xxxvi–lxxv).
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Conclusion
Based on the analysis of problems covered by this
article, several important problems of dealing with
computer crimes are outlined. One of the primary issues
among them is the problem of the legal regulation of
computer crimes. Against this background, it becomes
increasingly apparent that Georgia needs to consider
ratifying the Council of Europe Convention on
Cybercrime swiftly. In addition, it is necessary to extend
the borders of international cooperation and accelerate
the training of digital evidence specialists for a future
Computer Crime Division.
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